Memes are expressions of ideas that are typically instantiated as static image macros (combinations of images and text) circulated on social media. Their semantic complexity and extensive penetration into numerous, diverse fields of discourse bode significant implications when understood from a social epistemological approach. Because memes can be used to say or assert propositions, they clearly qualify as a legitimate mode of testimony.
In this essay, I will undertake an investigation of the epistemically relevant features of along the understanding-why/knowing-why distinction (henceforth denoted ‹understanding› and ‹knowing›) and conclude that memes offer a novel vector for the transmissibility of understanding. I will begin by elucidating a basic taxonomic approach to memes that will be applied within this paper. In the following section, I sketch a brief overview of the understanding/knowledge distinction. With this groundwork in place, I will then propose three features of memes that I identify as epistemically salient (particularly as pertains to understanding): interactiveness, intuitiveness, and information density. These traits will be explored individually in turn. Finally, I will draw attention to two serious epistemic threats that are raised by memes– threats which must be taken seriously given their volatile potential.
Terminology & taxonomy
Memes and macros can be respectively analogised along the type/token distinction. Memes are types of expressions which are represented by meme templates, while macros denote individual variants on the generic template (tokens). Colloquially, the word «meme» is used to also designate macros, and in some artistic communities macro denotes juxtaposition of text and image as an artistic medium. That said, for the purposes of precision, I will continue to use the meme/macro-type/token analogy in this paper.
Two general narratological elements of meme structure can be distinguished: cultural references and general propositional structure. The former spans whatever common symbols or ideas are appealed to in order to assert a proposition (for instance, two screenshots from Drake’s Hotline Bling music video). The latter refers to any of the myriad forms of assertion that may be inherent to a particular meme (in the former case, value judgment– specifically, individual approbation) (Zharova 2018). The cultural references that a meme draws upon as well as its general propositional structure are intimately tied to the types of propositions that can be articulated with that meme (as well as to the success of these propositions).
On standard accounts, knowledge and understanding both involve a conjunction of true belief with some sort of «anchor» (Meno 97e, Hills 2015): knowledge must be justified, and understanding entails cognitive control (henceforth abbreviated ‹CC›). Justification is broadly understood as some sort of substantive account grounding belief (and thus making true belief more valuable), while CC implies competent grasp of the conceptual relations underlying a belief (Hills 2015). Because [paradigmatically] both knowledge and understanding require belief, they are both factive states (idem). Justification disqualifies the epistemic candidacy of true beliefs that are founded on luck and defeated evidence (idem). Justification is generally codified so as to accommodate testimony, as much of the knowledge we learn comes from other individuals (Adler 2017). On the other hand, the CC necessary for understanding is compatible with luck and defeated evidence (Hills 2015). However, because such abductive proficiency is not easily reducible to propositional statements (at least according to anti-intellectualists), understanding is not considered to be easily transferred via testimony (idem). For these reasons, knowledge and understanding ought to be considered as distinct epistemic states.
Justification and CC constitute the foremost point of contradistinction between knowledge and understanding. Justification disqualifies the epistemic candidacy of true beliefs that are founded on luck and defeated evidence (idem):
Luck: If S might as well have had an illegitimate reason for believing P (e.g. as a result of Gettier luck or environmental luck), then S can no longer can be said to know P (even if P is true).
Defeated evidence: When S learns that their previous reason for believing P was actually wrong, S no longer can be said to know P (even if P is true).
Justification is generally codified so as to accommodate testimony, as much of the knowledge we learn comes from other individuals (Adler 2017):
Testimonial transmissibility: If S knows P, and S tells A that P, and A takes S to be a credible source with respect to P, then, ceteris paribus, A knows P.
On the other hand, the CC necessary for understanding is generally understood to be compatible with luck and defeated evidence (Hills 2015). However, CC is not generally regarded to be easily transmissible via testimony. This is because discrete propositional statements are intuitively well-suited for testimonial transmission. Unfortunately, CC is not easily decomposable to propositional statements, and no alternative account of testimonial transmissibility is forthcoming. As a result, understanding is not regarded to be easily transferred via testimony (idem).
A physician tells her patient, a longtime smoker, that he has been diagnosed with lung cancer. He knows why he has lung cancer (because he has smoked all his life), but insofar as he is unable to diagnose others with lung cancer, nor speculate about the pathophysiology behind any diagnosis, he does not understand why he has lung cancer.
These subtle differences between justification and CC underlie significant differences in how knowledge and understanding are naturally attributed, consequently offering compelling reason to consider them as distinct epistemic states. At least three different species of understanding have been identified in the literature (Kvanvig 2007): atomistic understanding (understanding what/why/when), objectual understanding (understanding some broad field or idea), and propositional understanding (understanding that). I will not delve into the differences between these types of understanding, but I should like to mention that the type of understanding I am interested in connecting to memes is atomistic understanding, particularly understanding why.
Sense and transmissibility
It is possible that the relative intransmissibility of understanding has been concluded on the basis of incomplete conjecture. The transmissibility of knowledge (and intransmissibility of understanding) may in fact merely suggest a limitation of simple Fregean Senses, such as testimony that is only verbal or only textual. By employing multiple channels of semantic signalling (textual, graphic, etc.), memes offer an unprecedentedly interactive, intuitive, informationally dense form of testimony– features that I contend may be sufficient for transferring understanding. I will now visit each of these in turn.
Memes as vectors of understanding
Interactiveness
Memes offer an extraordinarily open, decisively participatory platform both for creators and for consumers. Due to the simplicity of their format (and the wide availability of meme generators), anyone can make a meme. The universality of memes both opens a channel for and extends the potential reach of authors. Moreover, creator identity is largely irrelevant in memes. Because nearly all macros bear no mark of authorship, speaker identity as well as any attendant audience-side bias exert minimal influence on the interpretation of a meme. The accessibility and anonymity of memes thus also constitute valuable assets towards the end of what Fricker calls hermeneutical epistemic justice (2012).
An audience’s successful comprehension of a meme entails two levels of CC: grasp of the concept conveyed by that particular macro, as well as a more meta-level mastery of how to use the meme template to assert further propositions (perhaps a type of tacit knowledge; appendix §1). Even if they do not produce macros themselves, meme audiences nevertheless do gain substantive, enduring CC from meme consumption.
Intuitiveness
As previously elaborated, memes frame propositions by offering both ready-made cultural references as well as conceptual structures. Mutual familiarity of the content as well as forms of reasoning between authors and audiences simultaneously alleviates their constructive and interpretive labour. An author need only organise these building blocks to convey the elements of CC in an intuitive manner. And an audience need not even be familiar with all of the cultural references or the meme to obtain some degree of understanding: recognising the most salient narratological elements often suffices for minimal CC. The transmissibility of understanding via memes can thus also be understood as gradable: total familiarity with all of the references is not required for understanding a meme (usually, recognising the salient narratological elements suffices for minimal CC), nor does total referential familiarity guarantee full CC.
Moreover, different meme templates offer various conceptual structures to be filled in by the author. Certain templates may be more suitable than others depending on the underlying logical structure and nuance of the proposition which the author wishes to convey (e.g., value judgment, dilemma, critique…):
Generic templates can furthermore be mixed, layered, and subverted, modifying the core conceptual structure and consequently the proposition conveyed (appendix §3; Zharova 2018). Thus, memes offer a universal medium with great potential for inventive exploitation.
Informational density
Through juxtaposition, images, text, and even font choice together can convey far more meaning than they could independently. The interactions between different types of elements (e.g. font and text) as well as token elements (imposed images) synergistically amplifies the semantic efficiency of a meme, often allowing complex ideas to be concisely summarised (appendix §3).
Esotericism– intentionally obscuring the meaning of a meme so as to make it anti-intuitive to certain audiences– is often deliberately employed as a technique to build ingroup/outgroup distinctions. Esotericism may be accomplished either by the types of cultural references an author draws on or by intentionally obfuscating the conceptual structure of a meme (see left; both techniques are exemplified). This metacommunicative potential of memes which follows from a subversion of their intuitive nature adds to the profound informational density of memes.
Oversimplification & memeification
Propagative & semantic volatility
It is difficult to predict the long-term epistemic consequences of memes. A central distinguishing feature of memes is their propensity for rapid spread (above) and mutation (Anti-Defamation League 2016). The exponential circulation of a progenitor macro is invariably followed by a wave of variations on the general format. These variants are volatile in the sense that, with continued propagation, they become increasingly prone to dramatic changes in connotation (idem).
It is difficult to predict the long-term epistemic consequences of memes. A central distinguishing feature of memes is their propensity for rapid spread (above) and mutation (Anti-Defamation League 2016). The exponential circulation of a progenitor macro is invariably followed by a wave of variations on the general format. These variants are volatile in the sense that, with continued propagation, they become increasingly prone to dramatic changes in connotation (idem).
A meme’s propagative success is predominantly determined by its intelligibility and intuitiveness rather than any of its epistemic merits (e.g. fidelity). Memes that oversimplify their subject matter may thus precipitate rampant, compelling, and intractable misrepresentation. At worst, memes can hijack discourse by substituting the ideas at issue with ridiculous, sometimes propagandised caricatures of those ideas (below, Paleo-Futurist Bolsjevism 2018). The memetisation of an idea is caused primarily by unreflective consumption of memes and to a lesser extent by malicious authorship, especially in the setting of identity politics. Creator anonymity has in some instances contributed to this trend by masking auctorial intention, precipitating uncertainty as to whether an extreme-sounding assertion was sincerely posited (Aikin 2009).
Detaching CC from Gettier luck and defeated evidence makes possible open-endedness in the sense that there are many ways to achieve understanding. At the same time, it is entirely likely that consumers of memes acquire large amounts of misunderstanding. Viz., an individual consuming memes can come to possess CC over a multitude of beliefs, some of which are true and some of which are false. Furthermore, because CC entails the ability to draw bidirectional inferences over a range of similar cases, misunderstanding may even precipitate a cascade of epistemic repercussions– not limited to the original epistemic agent.
The exigency of understanding & memeing well
Memes evince a plethora of epistemically salient features that portend both opportunity and risk. As a mode of testimony, memes represent one way in which the cognitive control necessary for understanding may be transmitted between epistemic agents, thereby opening up diverse positive epistemic prospects. At the same time, this transitivity makes possible the broad dissemination of misunderstanding. These already considerable stakes are furthermore compounded by the volatile nature of memes. Memes have quickly become a dominant and pervasive force in the modern linguasphere (me.me 2018). As consumers of memes, we must pursue a social epistemology of memes lest we be consumed by them.
