The concept of original ontological unity, otherwise described as One Mind, the Mind of All Sentient Beings, or Ultimate Reality, is the thesis that there is a fundamental oneness and sameness underlying all individuals and things. Therefore, any semblance of difference or alterity is merely an illusion. Noumenal reality is singular, while phenomenal reality is manifold. Personal identity as well as all other ostensible ontic differences arise from a foundational ignorance. Enlightenment, then, consists in coming to grasp universal oneness, thereby «extinguishing» the ego self.
Ontological unity comprises the foundation of Chinese Buddhist views on generosity in The Awakening of Faith. Yet, on Shen’s analysis, this radically anti-individualising notion exerts tension on views of generosity qua other-oriented virtue. In this essay, I will give an account of this quandary and consider possible solutions, beginning with an overview of the conceptual foundation of generosity in Chinese Buddhism.
The puzzle of generosity
In seeking the basis of generosity in Buddhism, Shen examines the concept of huixiang («turning towards»). Species of huixiang are broadly distinguished into two general categories by their directionality:
Bodhi huixiang: Turning one’s mind upward towards enlightenment/wisdom
Zhongsheng huixiang: Turning one’s spiritual merits outwards or horizontally towards others.
However, because enlightenment is the ultimate goal of Buddhism, bodhi huixiang always takes precedence over zhongsheng huixiang. According to Huiyuan, this is because, in contrast to the infinite goodness cultivated for Buddha’s sake, our own individual goodness is limited. There is thus a certain modesty about the amount of good that one can do before achieving enlightenment. That said, the highest form of generosity that one can gift to others is to promote others’ enlightenment. Yet, the enlightenment of the self is often prerequisite to the enlightenment of others.
The picture of generosity that emerges from these considerations is quintessentially Buddhist in its detachment. Counterintuitively, the understanding of original ontological unity should, at most, serve to inspire compassion towards others. But while the recognition of commonality with the Other might serve as the catalyst for huixiang, it is not its proper impetus. Rather, huixiang ought to be practiced in keeping with ontological unity and the basic emptiness of the ego self. Properly executed, huixiang is done mindlessly– «as if one is not doing so»: unconditionally, without benefactor, benefit, or beneficiary.
Detachment– both from one’s own avarice as well as one’s own compassion– thus characterises the Chinese Buddhist conception of generosity. But it’s not only the self that is renounced in this picture of generosity. It is also the Other. It would seem that if original ontological unity really does entail a monist ontology, then alterity would be exposed as illusory, theoretically frivolous, and likely even impedimental to pure generosity. In turn, ethical concern is reduced to, at best, a merely instrumental precondition to enlightenment.
Dereliction– or worse?
This puzzle of generosity in Chinese Buddhism is fundamentally a question of first philosophy: whether ontology ought to precede ethics, or vice versa. Along these lines, because Chinese Buddhism takes original ontological unity as theoretically primitive, generosity must be explained in terms of this axiom of universality. But then it is not clear whether generosity, or other-regarding virtues more generally, are intelligible without an ontology of the Other. Furthermore, Chinese Buddhism’s apparent divergence from empathic moral motivation, and indeed, from moral motivation as we know it in the West, might cause alarm for some commentators.
Shen, in particular, takes issue with this subordination of ethics. Yet he does not fully elaborate his concerns about the privileging of ontology as it pertains to generosity. Extrapolating, I would presume that Shen is concerned that, on the practical level, the overemphasis on enlightenment as a path towards ontological unity might lead us to disregard our ethical obligations to others. The ontology-first approach gets it backwards– after all, what is the use of detached gestures of huixiang to those whose vital needs are not fulfilled? Enlightenment, as it were, has usurped our basic ethical duties. I suspect that it is for reasons more or less similar to these that Shen thinks that ethics should be first philosophy. This would mean taking the Other as primitive, and hence rejecting the monist ontology entailed by original ontological unity. In this case, it is because of our ethical concern that we stipulate the Other as ontologically primitive. In this way, we might preserve the practical merits of generosity.
Afterthoughts
Surpassing generosity
I personally find the ontology-first approach to generosity to be elegantly coherent. I do believe that the acceptance of original ontological unity brings one into a post-ethical state. The enlightened individual does not need to rely on ethics as a systematic basis for action. Hence, the mindlessness of huixiang (which finds notable parallels in the Aristotelian virtuous disposition). In this state, it’s not just that generosity requires no theoretical grounding, but generosity itself requires no espousing. If we were to take enlightenment seriously, the achievement of this post-ethical state should count as ethical (and/or metaethical) progress. After all, utopia– the place where ethics is obsolete– ought arguably to be the ultimate goal of any ethics.
Detachment as empathy at critical mass
At first, the ontology-first view of generosity might understandably seem outwardly detached in a rather alarming way. Yet, perhaps we might be able to put this view of generosity into perspective by dissecting the paradox at the core of the ontology-first view. What bears the unfortunate Western connotations of the English word «detachment» might in fact really be the apotheosis of empathy. The sublimation of empathy itself might involve the transcendence of alterity. At peak concern for the Other, the ontic boundaries separating individuals might dissolve entirely. If this is true, then perhaps there is a possibility for some sort of linear trajectory towards enlightenment along which zhongsheng huixiang might find its proper place.
Sidetracks to Nirvana
Lastly, I believe that Shen’s concerns about the practical viability of the ontology-first view of generosity stem from a preoccupation with theory altogether, rather than our particular inclinations as concerns first philosophy. This is because the question of first philosophy underdetermines these practical matters. In other words, there are a number of ways to address the apparent neglect of our ethical duties on the practical level without having to call into question the priority of ontological unity or the Other. For instance, one might argue that the most promising path to enlightenment, whether for oneself or for others, need not always be the most direct path. What I mean is that a little bit of Maslowian sensibility and pragmatism might go a long way towards successfully navigating the territories uncharted by theory: perhaps, for instance, we might still help others to achieve enlightenment by first helping them meet their basic needs: food, shelter, safety, etc. Perhaps these digressions on our way to enlightenment might lead us to become better at huixiang, and perhaps, the right path lies not in inward retreat but in a sincere form of strangification whose terms and motivations arise not from the self.
Bibliography
Hakeda, Yoshito S., trans. The Awakening of Faith. New York: Columbia University Press, 1967.
Lai, Karyn. “XI. Chinese Buddhism.” In An Introduction to Chinese Philosophy, 235–68. MA: Cambridge University Press, 2017.
Shen, Vincent. “III. The Ethics of Generosity in Chinese Mahayana Buddhism: Theory and Practice.” In Dao Companion to Chinese Buddhist Philosophy, edited by Youru Wang and Sandra A. Wawrytko, 45–67. Dordrecht: Springer Netherlands, 2018.
